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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE
EXPECTANCY OF ENTITLEMENT BENEFITS
Paul Caritj*
This Note proposes a new tort to address employers' and their agents' increasing
abuse of the Unemployment Insurance appeals process, which interferes with em-
ployees' expectancy of entitlement benefits. Though existi ng state Unemployment
Compensation statutes sanction both unemployed workers claiming benefits and
employers for making fraudulent statements, these provisions approach the issue
of fraud too narrowly to combat this growing problem. Meanwhile, no existing
remedy properly compensates victims of this sort of abuse, adequately deters abu-
sive behavior by scaling the penalty to the harm, and is accessible to economically
disadvantaged plaintiffs. As well as providing an analysis of the specific problem
of abuse of the appeals process in the Unemployment Compensation arena, this
Note also aspires to provide the framework for a compelling legal argument that
such abuse should trigger tort liability in the hopes of easing the work of any pub-
lic interest attorney interested in bringing such a suit. Although this Note focuses
on Unemployment Insurance claims, the principles discussed are generally appli-
cable to a variety of other entitlement benefit claims.
Part I identifies the employer behavior that presents the need for a remedy in tort.
Part II articulates the criteria for an adequate remedy. Part III examines poten-
tial legal remedies to the problem of abusive appeals by employers during the claim
and appeals process and finds them inadequate to protect the pressing economic
interests of claimants and society. Part IV proposes the recognition of a new tort to
fill this gap, and details both the grounds for liability and the computation of
damages flowing from this form of liability.
PART I
Roughly forty-five percent of all Americans live in a household
that receives some form of government benefits, including Medi-
care, Medicaid, Unemployment Compensation, and Energy
Assistance.' These programs are not designed to produce economic
J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Michigan Law School. Managing Notes Editor,
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 45; Lead Article Editor, University of
Michigan journal of Private Equity and Venture Capital Law, Volume 1. Thanks to my wife, Liz,
for her tolerance of my constant discussion of topics that many reasonable people would
find oppressively boring. Thanks also to Erica Wilczynski andJoanna Lampe for their edito-
rial assistance as well as Jacob Danzinger, Amy Livingston, John Robinson, Yue Wang, Erin
Eckles, and the rest of the Volume 45 staff.
1. THOMAS PALUMBO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EcoNomic CHARACTERISTICS OF HoUSE-
HOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES: THIRD QUARTER 2008, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/201Opubs/p70-119.pdf.
455
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
windfalls; rather, they are intended to provide a social safety net in
order to prevent financial catastrophe in vulnerable families. Un-
employment Compensation, for example, is designed only to
mitigate the substantial economic pain of unemployment and
"lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon
the unemployed worker and his family."2
But an Unemployment Compensation claim does not just in-
volve a worker and the state. A worker's successful Unemployment
Compensation claim affects her former employer's tax rate. There-
fore, the law in every state provides procedures by which
employers may protest benefit determinations and awards.3 The
employer is sent a questionnaire at the beginning of the benefit
determination process to ask about the circumstances of the work-
er's separation (a worker is not eligible for benefits if, for example,
he quit his job voluntarily, or if he was terminated for "miscon-
duct"). Even after a worker has begun to receive checks in the
mail, an employer may still protest the worker's benefit determina-
tion.
Unfortunately, while providing employers with the opportunity
to protect their own interests, the employer protest system also
creates the potential for abuse. A malicious employer could file
baseless protests in order to reduce its tax liability. The claimant
would then be forced to take the initiative, time, and expense to
pursue an appeal to restore her benefits, which are typically termi-
nated until resolution of the appeal. The additional tax liability,
however, visited upon an employer by a single Unemployment In-
surance claim is modest. Therefore, one might expect that
employers would be deterred from pursuing baseless protests and
appeals by the effort and expense required.
This reassuring thought, however, is becoming a fiction as more
and more employers outsource the processing of their Unem-
ployment Compensation claims. By lowering costs, outsourcing
disturbs the balance of incentives that might have led employers to
mount appeals only in good faith. Companies such as Talx Corp.
now promise to reduce employers' overall Unemployment Com-
2. MICH. Comp. LAWs § 421.2 (2001).
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3323 (2005); GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-8-192 (2008);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 341.420 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.32(d) (2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35A-4-406 (2005).
4. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs § 421.29 (2001).
5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3323 (2005); GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-8-192 (2008);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.420 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.32(d) (2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35A-4-406 (2005).
6. Manage Your Unemployment Costs with The Industry Leader-Tax, TALX CORP., http://
www.talx.com/Solutions/Compliance/UnemploymentTax/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
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pensation costs by easing both employers' administrative burden
and their tax liability (by filing more protests and winning more
appeals).
While there is little reason to doubt that Talx and other firms
can indeed achieve substantial savings through specialization and
economies of scale, these savings may come at the expense of so-
cial responsibility. Many advocates who have fought protests filed
by Talx, for example, report that these protests seem not to have
been based upon any investigation at all, but merely filed in the
hopes that the worker would not challenge it.7 Whether a systemat-
ic and intentional result of Talx's cost-cutting business practices or
an accidental result of Talx's struggle to cope with "tight deadlines,
confusing state rules or uncooperative employers,"" real workers
are deprived of benefits by Talx's failure to litigate in good faith.
This behavior is enabled by lax statutory protections. Although
state Unemployment Compensation laws often contain provisions
to punish fraudulent statements to state Unemployment Compen-
sation agencies, these provisions calibrate their penalties to the
state's loss (through lost tax revenues), not harm to claimants.9
Further, these statutory fraud provisions typically require a show-
ing of just that: fraud. 0 Thus, there is no statutory penalty for an
employer who protests determinations without regard for their
accuracy, so long as the employer does not know that it is pursuing
a false claim.
There is also no recognized private law remedy. Not a single
case has been reported that involves a civil suit by a claimant
against an Unemployment Compensation cost management firm
regarding the firm's behavior in the appeals process. And because
any potential plaintiffs in these suits are typically economically dis-
advantaged, they are poorly situated to protect their rights through
creative litigation. Certainly, the behavior of Talx itself seems to
show that these firms believe that current law creates no liability
for their activities.
It seems almost too obvious to mention that claimants often suf-
fer grave economic harm from bad-faith employer protests.
7. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, ContestingJobless Claims Becomes a Boom Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2010, at Al. ("'Talx often files appeals regardless of merits,' said Jonathan P. Baird, a
lawyer at New Hampshire Legal Assistance. 'It's sort of a war of attrition. If you appeal a
certain percentage of cases, there are going to be those workers who give up.'").
8. Id.
9. See, e.g, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.54(b) (2001); Mo. REv. STAT. § 288.395 (2010);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 612.732(2) (a)-(b) (2009); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-703 (2011).
10. See, e.g, MICH. Comp. LAws § 421.54(b) (2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.395 (2010);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 612.732(2) (a)-(b) (2009); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-703 (2011).
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Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to spell out some of the more dra-
matic consequences.
Unemployment Compensation claimants often have no income
other than their Unemployment Compensation benefits-they are,
after all, unemployed. Furthermore, the intended and likely effect of
an employer's protest is to cause the state agency to find a claimant
ineligible for benefits, cutting off the flow of benefits until the
claimant is able to mount a successful appeal. In some states, the
appeal process can take many months," so if the claimant is unable
to find a new job in the meantime, he may face many months with
neither employment income nor the benefits intended by the state
policy underlying the Unemployment Compensation statute.
Such an extended period of financial catastrophe can bring with
it many other harms. After months without income, many jobless
workers will have exhausted their savings and be forced to move in
with relatives or be forced into homelessness. At the same time,
because the appeals process can be confusing and because unem-
ployment creates its own stresses, many workers will fail to meet
their appeal deadlines and, therefore, be unable to recover any of
the benefits to which they were entitled.
Thus, an employer's bad-faith protest will often cause harms to
the claimant beyond the monetary amount of the claim itself,
whether or not the claimant is ultimately able to vindicate her
rights through the appeal process. Consider three possible out-
comes of an employer protest where the worker is genuinely
entitled to a benefit amount of $300/week:
1. The worker files a timely appeal of the agency's adverse rede-
termination (issued in reliance on the employer's protest) and the
state Unemployment Compensation agency schedules a hearing.
Ten weeks pass before the agency issues the hearing notice, and
the hearing itself is not scheduled for another eight weeks after
that date. The worker's appeal is ultimately successful, and his
benefits are reinstated. He is now entitled to $5,400 in retroactive
benefits from the state. Unfortunately, this claimant was unable to
pay for the necessary repairs to his car after it broke down three
weeks into the appeal process because he had no income. This has
greatly limited his ability to find new work; he was offered a new
11. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, State Rankings of Core Measures: Jan-Dec 2010, http://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/ranking.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (select "Av-
erage Age of Pending Lower Authority Appeals"; then selectJan.-Dec. 2010) (showing that
the average Unemployment Compensation lower authority appeal takes 46.5 days to be
adjudicated after filing; the average higher authority appeal is not adjudicated for another
105.6 days after filing; this does not include the time that elapses between initial filing,
agency determination, protest, and agency redetermination).
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job on the other side of town, but was unable to accept it because
he had no reliable way of getting there. Thus, our claimant's actual
damages from his employer's protest are at least $5,400 in back
benefits (already claimed through the appeals process) plus, po-
tentially, the lost income from the job he was unable to accept.1
There is an additional potential perversity: a claimant must show
that he is "available for work" to be eligible for Unemployment
Compensation benefits. In some cases, workers have been disquali-
fied from benefits for restricting the geographic scope of their job
search because of transportation difficulties. 13 Thus, a worker
whose transportation difficulties are caused by the discontinuation
of his Unemployment Compensation benefits might also find him-
self disqualified from benefits for failing to be available for work.
2. The worker receives notice of the unfavorable redetermina-
tion of her eligibility for benefits but does not understand or is
intimidated by the appeals procedure (perhaps also believing that
she has sufficient savings to last until she is able to find a new job).
Two months pass, no new work has come her way, and her savings
are exhausted. Newly motivated, she appeals the determination
she received two months before. Unfortunately, the deadline to
appeal has passed and it will now be extremely difficult for her to
revive her Unemployment Compensation claim, regardless of its
merits. She will be barred from receiving any benefits until she
finds a new job and earns sufficient wages to re-qualify for the Un-
employment Compensation program. Fortunately, she is young
and able to move back in with her parents. Nonetheless, a year
passes before she is able to find new full-time work. She has there-
fore been deprived of fifty-four weeks of benefits, benefits worth
$16,200.
3. The worker files a timely appeal of the agency's
redetermination (issued in reliance on the employer's protest).
But the state Unemployment Compensation agency, instead of
scheduling a hearing, reconsiders their redetermination internally,
relying again on information provided in the employer's protest. It
again finds in the employer's favor and issues a new adverse
redetermination ten weeks later. The worker, desperate and in need
of benefits, appeals this redetermination as well and the agency
issues a hearing notice ten weeks later. The hearing is scheduled
another four weeks after the date of the hearing notice. A favorable
decision is issued one week after the hearing. Thus, twenty-five
12. Though this should be offset, of course, by the amount he received in Unem-
ployment Compensation for the period when he could have been employed.
13. See, e.g., Ditmore v. Terry's Lounge, No. 78-838-555-AE (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20,
1979).
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weeks pass between the termination of our claimant's benefits and
their subsequent reinstatement. Though our worker is entitled to
$7,500 in retroactive benefits and his future benefits are reinstated
at the previous rate of $300 per week, this is not enough to undo
the damage done in the meantime: after eight weeks without
income, he was unable to make rent payments and was evicted
from his apartment. Without family to fall back on, he has been
living in a homeless shelter since week nine.
The point of harping on these horror stories is not to argue that
the employer ought to be liable for all of these harms-they at
least present puzzles about proximate causation and quantification
of damages. Instead, they illustrate that it is not the unusual case
but, rather, the typical one in which the damages caused to a
worker by even a temporary denial of benefits exceed (sometimes
greatly) the actual monetary amount of the benefits themselves.
And they point towards additional costs as well: social costs.
Social welfare programs such as Unemployment Compensation
are not simply the benevolent whimsies of a nanny state. They are
also premised upon the more hard-nosed, utilitarian notion that
we all pay when any one of us falls too far behind. Consider again
the declared public policy motivation of the Michigan Employ-
ment Security Act:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious men-
ace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this
state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general inter-
est and concern which requires action by the legislature to
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and
his family, to the detriment of the welfare of the people of this
state. Social security requires protection against this hazard of
our economic life.'4
The idea behind Unemployment Compensation seems to be
this: while the law cannot (or, perhaps, should not) ensure equal
economic and social outcomes for all its citizens, the law should
prevent certain particularly bad outcomes from befalling any citi-
zen because they will also materially impact the lives of everyone
around him.
The "crushing" burden of unemployment has been identified as
one such unacceptable outcome for a number of reasons. The
most basic of these is that, while it might be costly to provide tem-
14. MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.2 (2001).
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porary support for a newly unemployed worker, the possible down-
stream costs of this worker's indigence-increased burden on
social services, socialization of his increased healthcare expenses,
increased crime, etc.-are much greater.
Meanwhile, we hope to create a healthier, more efficient labor
market through improved job matching. By reducing the unem-
ployed worker's economic peril, we allow him to make wiser
long-term decisions about what jobs to accept and which to de-
cline, thus increasing the time the worker will stay with that
employer. This means that employers spend less recruiting and
training new workers, and workers spend less time on the sidelines
searching forjobs."'
Unemployment Compensation and other entitlement benefit
programs are also components of the nation's economic stabiliza-
tion apparatus. In times of economic crisis, Unemployment
Compensation provides an automatic and immediate economic
stimulus, cushioning consumer demand from the otherwise jarring
effects of job loss. 16 In fact, Unemployment Compensation in par-
ticular is a highly effective means of economic stimulus: between
2010 and 2015 the Congressional Budget Office projects that every
dollar spent in Unemployment Compensation payments will boost
the national Gross Domestic Product by between $0.70 and $1.90."
Therefore, an employer's bad-faith decision to protest a work-
er's Unemployment Compensation claim unleashes both private
and public harms. These protests can cause economic damages to
claimants well in excess of their original benefit amounts. These
private harms alone are substantial enough to warrant the atten-
tion of the law of torts. But there are public harms as well: such
15. See, Mario Centeno, The Match Quality Gains from Unemployment Insurance, 39 J.
HUM. REsc. 839, 841 (2004); Marco Caliendo, Konstantinos Tatsiramos, Arne Uhlendorff,
Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration and job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity
Approach (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 4670, 2009); NAT'L EmP'T LAW
PROJECT, BEYOND SOUND BITES-UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE ON THE SEVERITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT (2010), available at http://www.nelp.
org/page/-/UI/DisincentiveUl.pdfnocdn=1 [hereinafter BEYOND SOUND BITES]. But see
Christian Belzil, Unemployment Insurance and Subsequent Job Duration:Job Matching vs. Unob-
served Heterogeneity, Institute for the Study of Labor (Inst. For the Study of Labor, Discussion
Paper No. 116, 2000).
16. See, e.g., Hassan Bougrine & Mario Seccareccia, Unemployment Insurance and Unem-
ployment: An Analysis of the Aggregate Demand-Side Effects for Postwar Canada, 13 INT'L. REV.
APPLIED ECON. 5, 19 (1999); Jonathan Gruber, The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unem-
ployment Insurance, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 192, 203 (1997).
17. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES FOR INCREASING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EM-
PLOYMENT IN 2010 AND 2011 18 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/108xx/docl0803/01-14-Employment.pdf [hereinafter POLICIES] (Compare this to
the $0.40-$1.20 boost from reducing employers' payroll taxes and the $0.10-$0.40 boost
from reducing income taxes.).
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behavior promotes broader social ills by frustrating the state's eco-
nomic policies and fraying the social safety net. Therefore, if the
law of torts exists to provide a framework for the allocation of
harm," it ought to provide a remedy for bad-faith employer pro-
tests of Unemployment Compensation claims, as well as other
bad-faith interference with entitlement benefit programs.
PART II
Before analyzing existing remedial schemes and considering
how they may be improved upon, it will be useful to re-articulate
the harms described above into specific law reform goals.
A. Compensation & Distributive Justice
Accepting as a premise that existing entitlement benefit pro-
grams promote the just allocation of resources, the disruption of
those programs constitutes a distributive injustice. 9 More concrete-
ly, when a needy person is deprived of benefits to which they are
entitled by law, that person is deprived of resources unjustly.
When, as demonstrated in Part I, this primary harm predictably
triggers the loss of additional resources (e.g., homelessness caused
by wrongful deprivation of Unemployment Compensation), the
distributional injustice is compounded. However, existing Ameri-
can tort doctrine does not provide a ready framework for
remedying these sorts of harms.o
The measure of a remedy for distributive injustice is simple: to
what extent does it return resources to their previous, just distribu-
tion? Thus, the distributive justice goal for a scheme to remedy
wrongful interference with the distribution of entitlement benefits
must simply be to fully compensate the victim; that is, it must re-
store to the victim the resources she would have enjoyed absent
the interference.
Entitlement benefits programs typically have economic as well as
humanitarian goals,' goals that are frustrated when benefits are
not distributed to the individuals entitled to them. Therefore, not
only does fully compensating the victim of the interference
18. See, e g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 10 (1st ed. 1941).
19. See generallyJames Konow, Which Is the Fairest One of All?: A Positive Analysis ofJustice
Theories, 41 J. EcON. LIT. 1188 (2003).
20. See infra Part III.C--D.
21. See supra Part I.
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achieve distributive justice goals, but it also minimizes disruption
of the economic system effectuated by the entitlement benefits
program.
Furthermore, fully compensating victims of interference would
promote private policing of fraudulent protests. Whereas entrusting
enforcement solely to state agencies makes enforcement a function
of political will and state resources, private-law enforcement would
help bring the intensity of enforcement into proportion with the
magnitude of the abuse. However, would-be plaintiffs will tend to
be poor, under-enforcement will remain a difficulty. See infra Part
II.C.
B. Proportional Deterrence
Similarly, to deter wrongful behavior, an ideal remedy would
impose costs on the wrongdoer proportional to the harm caused
to the victim. For example, a scheme where the state recouped
losses to claimants who missed their appeal deadlines where their
claims were wrongfully protested by the employer would fail to dis-
courage employers from wrongfully protesting benefits. A rational
(if unscrupulous) employer could take advantage of this situation
to minimize its Unemployment Compensation liability by continu-
ing its wrongful protests, thus burdening both claimants and
administrative agencies. If, by contrast, employers were made lia-
ble for these damages, a rational employer would protest only
when it believed success was reasonably likely on the merits, be-
cause damages to be paid a would-be plaintiff would almost
certainly outweigh an employer's modest tax savings from a suc-
cessful protest.
C. Accessibility
Because recipients of entitlement benefits are characteristically
socially and economically disempowered, claimants whose benefits
are wrongfully interfered with will find it particularly difficult to
vindicate their rights. Thus, an ideal remedy will be crafted with a
view towards accessibility. At the very least, this requires the clear
articulation of requirements for liability and recovery. In addition,
the availability of punitive damages or statutory penalties, for ex-
ample, may increase the availability of justice for these individuals
by attracting the interest of the plaintiffs bar.
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PART III
Today's law provides a number of potential remedies for wrong-
ful interference with benefit claims, though as discussed in Part IV,
infra, none achieves all three of the goals laid out above. State Un-
employment Compensation statutes provide for agency action or
criminal prosecution of fraud by claimants or employers; a num-
ber of states have passed reforms to curtail procedural abuses; the
common law provides a cause of action for abuse of legal process
or vexatious litigation. A novel tort theory might also provide a
remedy, but the elements of the tort have not yet been articulated.
A. Fraud Provisions
State Unemployment Compensation statutes currently penalize
employers and claimants alike for making false statements to the
state Unemployment Compensation agency. But these provisions'
demanding mental-state requirements insulate employers from
liability for all but the most malicious activities. Section 54 of the
the Michigan Employment Security Act is typical of state Unem-
ployment Compensation statutes in providing penalties for
[a]ny employing unit or an officer or agent of an employing
unit ... who makes a false statement or representation know-
ing it to be false, or knowingly and willfully with intent to
defraud fails to disclose a material fact . . . to prevent or re-
duce the payment of benefits to an individual entitled thereto
or to avoid becoming or remaining a subject employer, or to
avoid or reduce a contribution or other payment required
from an employing unit.. . .
Similarly, New York provides that "[a] ny person shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor who willfully makes a false statement or represen-
tation . .. in order to reduce the amount of contributions to the
fund."23
Both provisions are representative of state Unemployment
Compensation regimes across the nation in that they require actu-
al "willfulness" or "intent to defraud."2 4 Thus, so long as an
22. MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.54(b) (2001).
23. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 632 (McKinney 2002).
24. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2800 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-29-1 (West
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 421.54(j) (West 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1369
(2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-518 (2006).
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employer believes his statements to be true he does not run afoul
of the law even if, for example, the falsehoods are 'justified" only
by the employer's willful blindness or if the employer believes
them to be true unreasonably.
Both provisions are also typical in that they neither create a
right of action for the injured claimant nor grant him any part of
the statutory penalties imposed. Statutory fraud penalties clearly
conceive of Unemployment Compensation fraud as a harm to the
state whether perpetrated by the claimant or employer. Thus, the
vigor with which these provisions are enforced against employers
will primarily be a function of the fraud's cost to the state in the
form of lost tax revenues and the executive's political will. No di-
rect incentives are created to account for fraud's social costs
(disrupted welfare and economic policies) or fraud's direct pecu-
niary harm to claimants.
Thus, state fraud provisions fail to achieve any of the three pre-
viously articulated remedial goals. They provide no mechanism to
compensate claimant-victims for their losses because of the fraud
and therefore fail to correct distributive injustice, allow the frustra-
tion of the economic goals of Unemployment Compensation, and
create no incentive for private enforcement-a moot point, since
these statutes create no private right of action in the first place
and, thus, are totally inaccessible to claimants as remedial tools. 6
Meanwhile, by calibrating statutory penalties to the state's loss in-
stead of the claimant's, the statutes create uncertain and possibly
perverse economic incentives to employers."
B. "Unemployment Compensation Reform"
In response to the troublesome practices of some Unemploy-
ment Compensation risk management firms such as Talx, a
number of states have enacted "Unemployment Compensation
Reform" laws designed to, among other things, curtail abusive be-
28havior by employers' agents.
25. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.54(j) (2001 & West Supp. 2011) (requiring that
penalties collected be paid to the "unemployment compensation fund" and the "penalty
and interest account of the contingent fund"). Although these statutory penalties can be
quite significant, rising to treble damages or even criminal penalties when the damages are
particularly large, the damages considered by the statute are exclusively those suffered by
the state, not the claimant.
26. See supra Part II.A.
27. See supra Part II.B.
28. DeParle, supra note 7.
WINTER 2012] 465
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Wisconsin and Iowa have targeted a particular employer strat-
egy: failing to respond to agency requests for information only to
file a protest after benefits begin flowing to a claimant. Wisconsin
law, for example, now punishes employers for this behavior by
declining to demand repayment by claimants of benefits already
disbursed when the employers' own failure to respond to re-
quests for information caused the benefits to be distributed."
Typically, claimants are required to retroactively repay benefits
they received but to which further adjudication shows they were
not entitled. 0 Similarly, employer agents (such as Talx) may be
stripped of their ability to represent employers before the agency
if they are found to have failed to respond to requests for infor-
mation without good cause in more than five percent of the
appeals in which they have been involved.
Although such reforms may be helpful in encouraging respon-
sible behavior by Talx and other "risk management" firms, they do
not address (and were not designed to address) the broader prob-
lem of employers' inaccurate statements and baseless protests
brought by employers. Indeed, Wisconsin officials continue to
complain that Talx's statements to state agencies are inaccurate,
one of them writing " [s]ame problem as always ... Talx is Talx."3 1
C. Vexatious Litigation & Malicious Prosecution
Tort law provides liability for "[o]ne who uses a legal process,
whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish
a purpose for which it is not designed . . . for harm caused by the
",3
abuse of process.
One might suggest that employers (or their agents) who file
baseless appeals are using the Unemployment Compensation ap-
peals mechanism, a legal process, to intentionally suppress
legitimate Unemployment Compensation claims, a purpose for
which the appeals process is not designed.
However, the law seems to indicate that such a purpose, while
perhaps unintended in a broad sense, is not "vexatious."
For abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process
for an immediate purpose other than that for which it was de-
29. Wis. STAT. § 108.04(13)(c) (2009).
30. See, e.g., id. § 108.04(13) (d) (3).
31. Id. § 108.105(2).
32. DeParle, supra note 7.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 682 (1965).
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signed and intended. The usual case of abuse of process is
one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pres-
sure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or
to take some other action or refrain from it.
Under this "immediate purpose" analysis, the purpose of the
protest is, after all, to win the protest, not to achieve some goal
wholly unrelated to the legal process.
Wrongful use of civil proceedings3 5 is unhelpful for similar rea-
sons. Like vexatious litigation, this tort also declines to extend
liability to those who acted with the belief that the claim "may pos-
sibly be adjudicated in his favor."36 In the context of interference
with entitlement benefits, an interfering party will not only typical-
ly believe this, but it will also prove to be true all too often. In
addition, the tort only extends liability to those who initiate civil
proceedings.37 But an interfering party will never, by definition, be
the party who "sets the machinery of the law in motion" ;3s instead
they are merely influencing the adjudication of a claim already
underway.
D. A Novel Tort
It is a bedrock principle of Tort law, and the common law gen-
erally, that any harm is to have a legal remedy, not just those that
fall within the scope of a cause of action with a name and articu-
lable elements: "It is a settled and invariable principle, that every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress."09 Or, to use an old Roman slogan: "ubi jus ibi
remedium."o Unfortunately, such inspiring sentiments, whether in
Latin or English, provide little guidance to the litigant or her
34. Id. at cmt. b.
35. Id. § 674.
36. Id. at cmt. e.
37. Id.
38. Id. at cmt. a.
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 109); see also Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1949) ("Novelty of an
asserted right and lack of common-law precedent therefor are no reasons for denying its
existence. The common law does not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexible rules, but
rather of broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason, and common
sense.").
40. "Where there is a right there must be a remedy." See, e.g., Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d
174 (7th Cir. 1945). See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at 109; Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi
Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1633 (2004).
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lawyer who must persuade a skeptical judge that 'justice, reason,
and common sense" require liability for interference with the dis-
tribution of a claimant's benefits. Fortunately, however, we find
some additional guidance and support in the august volumes of
Law Reports:
[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage
another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable
if done withoutjust cause or excuse.
An employer's bad-faith protest clearly satisfies most of the ele-
ments of this test: it is harmful, intentional conduct. But a difficult
question remains: does the employer have just cause or excuse?
The same problem arises within the analytical framework of un-
intentional torts. Again, we could show, by hypothesis, that the
employer protested unreasonably and that this protest was the
proximate cause of the claimant's loss of benefits (and other at-
tendant harms). But the nettlesome question would remain: does
the employer owe the claimant a duty to only appeal reasonably
and in good faith?
Either way one approaches the issue it reduces to a problem of
distinguishing between wrongful and legitimate protests. The solu-
tion will both fix the contours of an employer's duties in the
context of an unintentional tort, and determine when an employer
acts intentionally for "good cause." This approach is promising; it
achieves the goals of compensation and proportionality. Because it
does not conform to an existing recognized cause of action, how-
ever, it places a substantial burden on the claimant's attorney to
formulate a wholly novel legal theory; the attorney will have to in-
vent and persuade a judge of the tort's elements and an
appropriate method of computing damages.
Having recognized the promise of a novel tort approach-and
the inadequacies of several other approaches-it remains to flesh
out the elements of this new cause of action. The remainder of this
Note does just this in the hopes of reducing the cost to an enter-
prising practitioner willing to pursue the still considerable
challenge of recovering in tort on behalf of a wronged claimant.
41. Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 598 at 613 (Eng.). See
generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Prima Facie Tort, 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967 & Supp. 2011).
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PART IV
The problem of identifying whether an employer's protest is
wrongful is really a much deeper problem in disguise: what sorts of
behavior are actionable in tort law? This question is certainly too
broad to answer here (if, indeed, it can be answered anywhere).
Fortunately we can avoid the full weight of this question by taking
a shortcut: instead of arguing from the first principles of tort law,
we can analogize to an existing, well-defined tort. Interference
torts are well suited to this task.
The term "interference tort" encompasses a broad set of more
specific torts such as interference with the performance of a con-
tract (hereinafter "interference with contract") , employment,4 3
prospective business relations,44 and expectancy of inheritance or
gift.45 Because these labels are vague and often shade into one an-
other, this Note will focus its discussion on tortious interference
with contract. The discussion is applicable to other members of
the interference-tort family as well.
The contours of modern interference torts are complex and
hinge upon, inter alia, intent, the propriety of the interfering par-
ty's motive, the means of interference, the nature of the
relationship interfered with, and whether the interfering party was
privileged to interfere as they did.4 ' But the most salient features of
this sort of tort are displayed in the twin English cases Lumley v.
Gye4 8 and Temperton v. Russell.49
In Lumley, a theater owner was held liable for knowingly entic-
ing an opera singer to break her exclusivity contract with a rival.
On these facts, and over the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff's remedies were limited to recovery on the contract, the
four-judge panel found (in a 3-1 decision) for the plaintiff, each
judge issuing his own opinion. Judge Crompton's conclusions
42. See, e.g., Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941); Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. &
Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979).
43. See, e.g., Nelson v. Fleet Nat'1 Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1996), Frank J. Cavico,
Tortious Interference with Contract in the At-WillEmployment Context, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 503
(2002).
44. See, e.g., Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q.B. 715.
45. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Meyer, 329 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979).
46. See, e.g., Builders Corp. of America v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 482, 484 n.1 (1957);
Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency and Individual Liberty Con-
siderations, 27 CONN. L. REv. 279, 300-01 (1994).
47. For a more thorough and systematic discussion of interference torts see RESTATE-
MEN[ (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 762-774B (1979); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 129-130 (5th ed. 1984); Wexler, supra note 46, at 284-301.
48. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
49. (1893) 1 Q.B. 715.
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were representative: "[A] person who wrongfully and maliciously
... interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant
by procuring the servant to depart from the master's service ...
whereby the master is injured, commits a wrongful act for which
he is responsible at law." 50Judge Erle added that "[t]he remedy on
the contract may be inadequate .... In such cases, he who pro-
cures the damage maliciously might justly be made responsible
beyond the liability of the contractor.""
Although the facts of Lumley suggested that interference might be
actionable only for disruption of a master-servant relationship, liabil-
ity was expanded to include malicious interference with any
contractual relationship, actual or prospective, in Temperton v.
Russell52 In Temperton, three trade unions pressured suppliers of con-
crete to break off any economic relations with the plaintiff, a builder,
in breach of their existing supply contracts. Because it was "mali-
cious," the unions were held to be liable for this interference.54
Today, tortious interference with contract (or, in the language of
the Restatement, intentional interference with performance of
contract by third persons) is covered by Section 766 of the Re-
statement, Second, of Torts. The Restatement explains that
[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) be-
tween another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the contract, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to
the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract.5 6
The Restatement introduces the term "improperly"5 as a substi-
tute for Temperton's5" "maliciousness" requirement and defines it as
a function of several factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
50. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53 (opinion of Crompton,J.).
51. Id. at 756 (opinion of Erle,J.).
52. Temperton, 1 Q.B. at 727-28.
53. Id. at 723-25.
54. Id. at 728.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1965).
56. Id.
57. Id. ch. 37 intro note.
58. (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 728.
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(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's
conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of ac-
tion of the actor and the contractual interests of the
other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct
to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Tortious interference with contract has received a great deal of
scholarly attention focusing on the tort's alleged frustration of the
economic efficiency goals of contract law and, in particular, the
possibility of efficient breach.60 Though it is an extremely common
cause of action in the United States,6 ' this attention has exposed
some real challenges to the rationale for recognizing this sort of
liability. 2 Nonetheless, two distinct themes have emerged, both of
which support the existence of a remedy for interfering with the
distribution of entitlement benefits at least as well as for interfer-
ence with performance of contract.
A. Protection of Property Rights
One line of reasoning analyzes and justifies tortious interference
with contract as, ultimately, a property tort. In essence, the idea is
this: by entering into a contractual relationship, a promisee gains a
property interest in the promisor's performance. Improper inter-
ference with that interest is then a straightforward property tort.
Benjamin Fine develops this point by way of an elaborate, illu-
minating, and charmingly arcadian analogy to the classic wild
animal pursuit cases.64 Fine identifies four stages of acquisition of a
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1965).
60. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REv. 877 (1990); Don-
ald C. Dowling, Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with Contract
Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 487 (1986); Gary Myers, The Deffering
Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 1097 (1993); Wexler, supra note 46.
61. See Wexler, supra note 46, at 280 n.9.
62. See Wexler, supra note 46, passim.
63. Albeit one shot through with qualifications imposed by the background law of
contracts.
64. Benjamin Fine, An Analysis of the Formation of Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interfer-
ence with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1116, 1139-42 (1983); see
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Keeble v. Hickeringill, 3 Salk. 9, 91 Eng. Rep.
659 (KB. 1707); Littledale v. Smith, 1 Taunt. 243a, 127 Eng. Rep. 826 (York Assizes 1788);
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property interest by pursuit, each distinguished by differing levels
of control by the pursuer over the fugitive resource and, corre-
spondingly, giving rise to differing rights against interference by
third parties." Fine thus analogizes the promisee of a contract to a
hunter closing in on her prey:
[1]ike the pursuer of a wild animal who has significantly ad-
vanced towards capture, the [promisee] has materially
advanced toward obtaining the [promisor's] performance
and thereby has a right to acquire that performance, a right
that is superior to a third party's right to advance his own
commercial interest.66
Professor Epstein similarly argues that interference torts analyti-
cally reduce to property torts, though he takes a novel approach:
he analyzes tortious interference with contract through the analyt-
ical framework of ostensible ownership."' The services promised by
the promisor of a contract are, in effect, converted by a third party
who takes them for himself with notice of the prior commitment.6
Under the common law of property, a bailee who sells a chattel
entrusted to him by the true owner is liable for conversion so long
as the purchaser does not know that the transaction is inconsistent
with the true owner's rights. If, on the other hand, the purchaser
has notice that the party with whom they are dealing is a mere
69bailee, liability shifts from the bailee to the purchaser.
The parallel between this straightforward property tort and tor-
tious interference with contract is clear: at least in broad strokes, a
third party who procures services for himself that the promisor has
already promised to someone else is not liable so long as the pur-
chaser did not knowo that the services were no longer the
promisor's to sell. In this scenario, as in the case of the ostensible
ownership outlined above, the original promisee has a cause of
action for breach of contract against the promisor. If, on the other
hand, the third party purchased the services with notice of the pri-
Hogarth v. Jackson, 2 Car. & P. 595, 172 Eng. Rep. 271 (C.P.D. 1827); Young v. Hichens, 6
Q.B. 606, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (1844).
65. Fine, supra note 64, at 1135-39.
66. Id. at 1142.
67. Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Owner-
ship, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 2-3.
70. The relationship between notice and malice is a complex one. Judge Crompton
held that acting with notice was malice. Lumley, supra note 42, at 752. The Restatement "im-
propriety" standard clearly presents a more complex picture. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766 (1965).
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or obligation, the original promisee also has an action for tortious
interference with contract against the new purchaser.
So, as Professor Wexler summarized, intentional interference
with contract seems to sit at the intersection of tort, property, and
contract law. It provides a cause of action in tort for the violation
of property rights that arise in the shadow of contract law. One
might, then, imagine analogous torts for interference with proper-
ty rights generated by other areas of law. And, indeed, we find at
least one other example: at the intersection of torts, property, and
estate law we also find interference with expectancy of inher-
itance.
Where these property rights exist, tort law should protect them.
Similarly, if entitlement claimants do indeed have property inter-
ests in their claims, then tort law should protect these interests as
well. And nothing as original as an analogy to ferae naturae is neces-
sary to find these rights: the Supreme Court has already concluded
that claimants hold property rights, protected by the 14th
Amendment,74 in their entitlement benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly.'-
Therefore, because the law of torts protects property rights from
interference, it protects claimants' entitlement benefits from inter-
ference. Where interference with contract lies at the intersection
of tort, property, and contract law and interference with expectan-
cy of inheritance lies at the intersection of tort, property, and
estate law, then this tort, interference with entitlement benefits,
lies at the intersection of tort, property, and poverty law.
B. Economic Efficiency & Inadequacy of Expectancy Damages
Another common thread in the literature defending tortious in-
terference with contract is the contention that, in a number of
common situations, tort liability for an interfering third party is
more efficient than the Holmesian, "perform or pay damages" 6
71. Epstein, supra note 67, at 2.
72. Wexler, supra note 46, at 282. Professor Wexler also includes a fourth area of law,
antitrust.
73. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Meyer, 329 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (recognizing the
propriety of a tort action for fraudulent suppression of a valid will); RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS § 774B (1965) (recognizing a cause of action for fraudulent suppression of
a will by a would-be beneficiary).
74. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
75. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) ("It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitle-
ments as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity."').
76. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it,-and nothing else.").
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approach of contract law. As Professor Friedman points out, "the
efficient breach rule, while designed to reduce transaction costs,
fares poorly precisely because of the expensive transactions [e.g.,
lawsuits] that it in fact generates."7, Expanding on this point, Pro-
fessor McChesney explains that in a typical three-party scenario (in
which a third-party tries to appropriate for himself services that
have already been promised to another), placing the property
right to the services in the promisee rather than the promisor will
typically result in lower transaction costs.78 If the promisor retains
the property right as envisioned by efficient breach theory, the in-
ducer will negotiate with the promisor. When, as a result of these
negotiations, the promisor breaches, a new transaction, perhaps a
lawsuit, is required to vindicate the promisee's contract rights. If,
on the other hand, the property right is placed in the promisee as
envisioned by tortious interference theory (and, correspondingly,
the inducer knows he may find himself the defendant in a lawsuit
if he procures the promisor's breach), the inducer will negotiate
directly with the promisee. If the inducer is successful in these ne-
gotiations, the promisor may then resell his services to the inducer,
and neither party need fear an additional lawsuit by the promisee.
Thus, if the property right is placed in the promisee only one
transaction is required: the inducer's purchase of the services from
the promisee. If the property right is left in the promisor, two may
be required: the inducer's initial purchase from the promisor as
well as a lawsuit by the promisee against the promisor.
William Landes and Richard Posner propose another way in
which tortious interference with contract promotes economic effi-
ciency. They theorize that interference torts protect a promisee's
interests by allowing her to recover when contract law would not,
such as when the promisor is judgment-proof." Similarly, Lillian
BeVier argues that the interference tort allows a promisee's disap-
pointment to be more fully compensated than expectancy
damages. In a suit for tortious interference with contract, damages
for loss of reputation, emotional distress, and other unforeseen
harms as well as punitive damages may be available on top of the
more conservatively calculated expectancy damages.1 Thus, tor-
tious interference with contract promotes efficiency by ensuring
77. Daniel Friedman, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1989).
78. See Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract versus "Efficient" Breach:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 150-52 (1999).
79. Id.
80. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tartfeasors: An Economic
Analysis, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 552-55 (1980).
81. BeVier, supra note 60, at 916-17.
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that the inducer values the promisor's services more than the
promisee, forcing him to internalize the full costs. 2
Interference with entitlement benefits also gives rise to ineffi-
cient allocations of resources and, therefore, ought similarly to be
curbed by tort law. Entitlement programs exist not only to relieve
the burdens of the poor, but also to improve the productivity of
the national economy. Limited redistribution of resources from
comparatively wealthy taxpayers to the very poor yields more pro-
ductive use of those resources. 3 Furthermore, whatever one's
individual views about the substantive economic theory at work
here, it is nonetheless true that this economic strategy has been
endorsed and adopted by both the national and state legislatures. 4
Therefore, the economic rationale for a remedy in tort for in-
terfering with entitlement benefits is at least as clear as the
economic rationale behind tortious interference with contract.
The economic theory underpinning tortious interference with
contract is controversial not only in its descriptive accuracy, but in
whether it has any explanatory role to play at all in the develop-
ment of the tort whether accurate or not.8 ' By contrast, the
economic rationale underlying entitlement benefits and, conse-
quently, a tort remedy for their disruption, is quite explicit and
well supported. 6 By disrupting these economic programs, then,
interference by third parties promotes inefficiency by blocking the
flow of resources from lower to higher value uses. In addition, it
increases the burden on already-overwhelmed state hearing offic-
87
es.
The theoretical justifications for the availability of tort remedies
for interference with contract-the protection of property rights
and promotion of economic efficiency-support the availability of
tort remedies for interference with entitlement benefits. There
remains, however, the task of tailoring the tort to ensure that these
interests are adequately protected.
82. Id. at 917.
83. See, e.g., BEYOND SOUND BITES, supra note 15; POLICIES, supra note 17, at 18 tbl. 1.
84. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.2 (2001); The Congressional Budget Office's Budget
and Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the H Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 39 (2008) (tes-
timony of Peter P. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
85. Indeed, many commentators assume tortious interference with contract to be an
economically inefficient aberration. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 60, at 509.
86. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.2 (2001).
87. SeeJerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litiga-
tion Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. RE. 772 (1974).
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C. Standard of Liability
Just as social interests require that claimants receive the benefits
to which they are entitled, social interests also require that claim-
ants not receive benefits to which they are not entitled. Not only
would this amount to an unjustified transfer of wealth, but it might
also affirmatively cause economic harm. In the Unemployment
Insurance context, for example, unemployed workers are not enti-
tled to benefits from an employer they left voluntarily." This
restriction protects against the "hazard to [the State], to the econ-
omy, and to the workman himself, of compensable self-induced
unemployment." 8 9 A similar rationale underlies the requirement
that beneficiaries continue to seek worko and not refuse a suitable
offer of employment." Therefore, any remedy available for inter-
ference with these benefits must be limited in such a way that
interested parties are not discouraged from protesting mistaken
benefit awards.
A tort remedy for interference with entitlement benefits must
respect the tension between a claimant's property interest in her
claim-a right that should be protected from improper
interference-and other parties' interests in protecting their own
rights in the face of benefit awards they believe to be improper.
Social interests also track these conflicting individual interests. Just
as a regime might err by making it too difficult for a claimant to
protect his rights, a regime might also err by making it too easy to
obtain benefits, thus chilling legitimate and socially valuable
challenges to benefit awards.
Tort law confronts a very similar problem in formulating the el-
ements of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings. There, the
Restatement requires an absence of "probable cause" for the ac-
tion. 9' The comments to the Restatement explain that this
requirement shields from liability a party who sues believing that
the claim "may possibly be adjudicated in his favor."9 3
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a
somewhat stricter standard: "to the best of [an attorney or unrep-
resented claimant's] knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," 4 factual
88. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 421.29(1)(a) (2001).
89. Jenkins v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 364 Mich. 379, 384 (1961).
90. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 421.28(1)(a) (2001).
91. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.29(1)(e) (2001); S.C. CODE, tit. 68-114(3)
(1986).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1967).
93. Id. at cmt. e.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
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contentions must have "evidentiary support"95 and "claims, defens-
es, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by
a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law." 96Although a party who,
because of his ignorance of the law, brings a suit doomed to fail
would not be liable for wrongful use of civil proceedings, he might
be subject to Rule 11 sanctions."
Between these two standards-malicious prosecution's lack of
probable cause, and Rule 11's "stop-and-think" approach 9"-the
Rule 11 standard seems the more appropriate test for impropriety.
As discussed above, 9 the "probable cause" standard is not appro-
priate in the context of entitlement benefit claims because most
interfering parties (e.g., employers in Unemployment Insurance
claims) interfere with the belief that they will succeed in block-
ing the distribution of benefits. In fact, the frequent success of
bad-faith protests is exactly the problem. Furthermore, the typi-
cal protest of an entitlement benefit award is more like a filing in
an ongoing proceeding than the initiation of a judicial proceeding
as required by the tort of malicious prosecution.
On the other hand, Rule 11 serves a purpose very similar to the
cause of action proposed in this Note. It is designed to "curb con-
duct that frustrates the aims of [securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding] .'o It
imposes a weak objective standard, requiring litigants to conduct a
reasonable investigation before making a filing, thus managing to
proscribe intentional, reckless, or willfully blind behavior without
fostering worries by litigants that they might have unwittingly ex-
posed themselves to liability, worries that might chill desirable,
legitimate behavior. Thus, it achieves the balance between protect-
ing claimants' rights by encompassing a great deal of wrongful
behavior without unduly deterring third parties from interfering
for good cause.
95. FED.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
97. For an example of a claim that did indeed warrant Rule 11 sanctions, but probably
would not have amounted to malicious prosecution, see Walker v. Northwest Corp., 108 F.3d
158 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming the award of Rule 11 sanctions for a plaintiff's invocation of
diversity jurisdiction without properly alleging factual diversity of citizenship among the
parties).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
99. See supra Part III.C.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. See also FED. R.
CIV. P. 1.
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Therefore, interference should be improper unless, to the best
of the party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
it is not interfering for any improper purpose, such as to har-
ass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
pursuing the claim;
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for estab-
lishing new law;
the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifi-
cally so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery;
and
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evi-
dence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
belief or a lack of information."o'
The claimant may recover for the pecuniary or other damages
proximately caused by this interference. These damages might in-
clude the benefit amount itself (if the benefits are no longer
available because of the expiration of appeal deadlines, etc.) as
well as other consequential damages such as loss of housing, loss of
employment, damage to reputation, and emotional distress. Many
of these damages should be available regardless of whether the
claimant ultimately received benefits or not through the claim-
and-appeal process; the delay caused by the appeals process can
in itself cause foreseeable harm to vulnerable claimants. o0 In this
case, however, if the plaintiff did not prevail in her underlying
benefit claim, this causation analysis must include an evaluation of
the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim to benefits. If the
claimant's underlying claim was not meritorious to begin with,
then outside interference, whether proper or not, was not a cause
of the plaintiffs harm and a tort remedy would be inappropriate.
One might worry, however, that this standard places too great a
discovery burden on claimants, the party least able to bear its costs.
This is indeed a pressing concern; as a practical matter it will often
101. SeeFED. R. Civ. P.11(b).
102. See supra Part I.
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be difficult for a claimant to show that her employer, the would-
be defendant, failed to suitably investigate its allegations. To do
so would likely require discovery of emails and memos as well as
depositions of officials of both the defendant and the relevant
administrative agencies. This would be an expensive undertaking
probably beyond the reach of most claimants.
But, to some extent, this challenge is by design. It is an im-
portant check on fraud in entitlement benefit systems to allow
third parties (or, in the case of Unemployment Insurance, the
claimant's employer) to provide potentially disqualifying infor-
mation to administrative agencies. Therefore it would be unwise to
chill this sort of activity by unduly increasing the risk that they
might become embroiled in a spurious lawsuit.
And important situations remain where this burden would not
prevent litigation from moving forward. A claimant may have ac-
cess to evidence of bad faith through his close relationship with
the interfering party. An Unemployment Compensation claimant,
for example, may have friends who continue to work for his for-
mer employer or may even be told directly by his former boss that
he intends to block the worker's claim regardless of its merits."o'
This sort of case, where evidence of impropriety is available even
without formal discovery, may lower the burden enough that the
claimant will be able to find willing representation.
This burden would also present a much smaller bar to a class ac-
tion lawsuit brought against a frequent offender, where the
discovery costs can be divided across a large number of claimants.
In the Unemployment Compensation context, this would likely be
a large employer or employer's agent with a history of improper
interference. In either situation-a class action or an individual
action where investigation is straightforward and inexpensive-the
potential availability of punitive damages may attract attorneys to
the victims of the most egregious violations.
The goals of this common law approach could also, of course,
be achieved through legislation. However, today's political climate
makes this unlikely. Far from expanding protections for entitle-
ment claimants, the current political mood seems to favor scaling
benefits back.'04 And while a statutory solution may be possible, it is
103. This author has personally represented Unemployment Compensation claimants
who were told just this by their former employers.
104. Mary Clare Jalonick, Associated Press, Republican Budget Includes Overhaul of Food
Stamps, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 18, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
financial news/D9MLU6M03.htm; Associated Press, Mich. Governor Signs Cut in Unemployment
Benefits, BusINESSWEEK (Mar. 28, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
financialnews/D9M8FFUOO.htm; William Selway, Broke U.S. States' $48 Billion Debt Drives
Reductions in Unemployment Aid, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://
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not necessary; the judiciary and existing common law ought to
provide liability for this sort of improper interference. The next
step is for attorneys and advocates to bring these arguments before
the courts.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the theoretical underpinnings of a tort are in place. Enti-
tlement claimants have a property right in their claims for
benefits.115Just as the owner of a widget has an action for trespass
against a third party who interferes with his enjoyment of it and a
buyer of widgets has an action for interference with contract
against a third party who improperly induces his supplier to
breach his supply contract, a claimant for entitlement benefits
ought to have a remedy in tort against someone who improperly
interferes with his pursuit of these benefits. This remedy merely
reproduces a pattern found throughout the law-the existence of
tort remedies for interference with property rights that arise by the
operation of a third area of law-to the apparently overlooked ar-
ea of poverty law. Furthermore, economic efficiency concerns
suggest that a tort remedy ought to exist to correct allocative inef-
ficiencies that arise (or persist) through improper interference. os
This Note proposes that this sort of improper interference is
tortious and suggests the name "interference with distribution of
entitlement benefits." To strike an appropriate balance between
maximizing the ability of claimants to vindicate their rights in
court and minimally chilling legitimate interference, the "stop-
and-think" standard from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be borrowed to distinguish wrongful, liability-
triggering conduct, from the legitimate. This would restore the
balance of incentives between claimants and employers in the Un-
employment Compensation appeal process, preventing form-letter
protests from disrupting the flow of benefits to those in need.
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-15/broke-u-s-states-48-billion-debt-drives-unemployment-
assistance-cuts.html.
105. See supra Part IV.A.
106. See supra Part IV.B.
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